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Abstract 
 
 
Over the last decade, neuroeconomic research has attracted increasing attention by 
economic modellers and methodologists. In this paper, I examine five issues about 
neuroeconomic modelling and methodology that have recently been subject to 
considerable controversy. For each issue, I explicate and appraise prominent 
neuroeconomists’ findings, focusing on those that are claimed to directly inform 
economic theorizing. Moreover, I assess often-made assertions concerning how 
neuroeconomic research putatively advances the economic modelling of choice. In 
doing so, I combine review and critical arguments to provide a methodological 
evaluation of neuroeconomists’ contributions. 
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 2 
Introduction 
 
 
Over the last few years, neuroeconomic research has attracted increasing attention 
by economic modellers and methodologists. Neuroeconomists’ (henceforth, NEs) 
calls to integrate insights from economics, psychology and neuroscience have 
sparked intense debates among the practitioners and the philosophers of these 
disciplines (see e.g. the special issues of Economics and Philosophy, 2008, Vol.24, 
no.3; Biology and Philosophy, 2011, Vol.26, no.5; and this Journal, 2010, Vol.17, 
no.2). At present, neuroeconomics (henceforth, NE) constitutes a highly 
fragmented discipline, whose relation to economics, psychology and neuroscience 
is hard to characterize precisely (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2010, and Harrison and Ross, 
2010). This, however, implies neither that the hitherto proposed characterizations 
of NE are equally accurate nor that every contribution at the interface between 
NE’s parent disciplines can be plausibly regarded as progress in NE. 
 
In this paper, I examine five issues about NE modelling and methodology that have 
recently been subject to considerable controversy, namely: (1) Does NE foster 
unification across its parent disciplines? (2) How do NEs’ findings inform the 
economic modelling of choice? (3) Do NEs’ findings advance model selection in 
economics? (4) What disciplines provide the basic constructs for NEs’ accounts of 
choice? (5) Does NE prompt a revolutionary expansion of the evidential base of 
economic theory? In the five Sections below, I draw on economic methodology, 
neuro-psychological research and philosophy of science to address these issues in 
turn. For each issue, I explicate and appraise prominent NEs’ findings, focusing on 
those that are claimed to directly inform economic theorizing. Moreover, I assess 
often-made assertions concerning how NE research putatively advances the 
economic modelling of choice. In doing so, I combine review and critical 
arguments to provide a methodological evaluation of NEs’ contributions. 
 
Before proceeding, let me put forward two preliminary caveats. First, different 
approaches to NE have been distinguished in the literature (see e.g. Craver and 
Alexandrova, 2008, on ‘neuroeconomics proper’ and ‘economic neural modelling’, 
and Ross, 2008, on ‘behavioural economics in the scanner’ and ‘neurocellular 
economics’). I shall emphasize the differences between specific approaches 
whenever these differences are material to the merits of NEs’ proposals. For now, 
this point is worth anticipating. NEs have started to pursue specialized research 
agendas, and may advance some of these agendas without providing substantive 
benefits to NE’s parent disciplines (see e.g. Kable, 2011, and Vromen, 2010). Still, 
several leading NEs take their contributions to yield substantive modelling and 
theoretical benefits to these disciplines. In this paper, I examine whether NEs’ 
contributions actually yield such benefits, devoting particular attention to the 
economic modelling of choice.
1
 
 
And second, the five issues I address do not exhaust the set of significant questions 
one may pose about NE (see e.g. Mäki, 2010, on the rhetoric of NE, and Fumagalli, 
2013, on NEs’ attempts to inform economic welfare analyses). Yet, as I illustrate 
                                                           
1
 NEs frequently use the terms ‘models’ and ‘theory’ interchangeably when presenting and 
discussing their findings. In this paper, I follow this terminological practice unless the 
cogency of my considerations hinges on specific differences between these two notions 
(see e.g. Hausman, 1992, ch.5, and Mäki, 1996, sec.5). 
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below, these five issues target the main respects in which NEs have claimed 
substantial advances. I take such issues to be especially interesting to economic 
modellers and methodologists, since they encompass both the major bones of 
contention between the proponents and the detractors of NE (see e.g. Sections 2, 3 
and 5 on the evidential and explanatory relevance of NE findings for other 
economists) and the most pressing challenges faced by NEs’ attempts to advance 
economic modelling and theorizing (see e.g. Section 1 on the intertheoretic 
relations between NE’s parent disciplines, and Section 4 on the reducibility of 
economic constructs to neural constructs). 
 
I shall detail in the relevant Sections the interrelations between the five issues I 
consider and what thesis I advocate regarding each issue. The central theme 
unifying my five theses can be explicated as follows. The NE literature has grown 
remarkably over the last decade, and a lot of interesting work is being done by 
leading NEs. In spite of these intradisciplinary advances, NEs have failed to make 
significant progress with respect to what they formerly singled out as the chief 
interdisciplinary goals of NE research. These failures are by no means unrelated, 
but originate from the evidential and epistemic challenges inherent in developing a 
unified modelling and theoretical framework spanning economics, psychology and 
neuroscience. Some of these challenges may be met thanks to ongoing advances in 
scanner technology and experimental design. Others, instead, are likely to persist in 
spite of these advances and hamper progress at the interface between NE’s parent 
disciplines for years to come. In this perspective, the five issues I examine can be 
seen as interrelated manifestations of a more general impasse, which will continue 
to hinder NEs’ interdisciplinary contributions irrespective of their intradisciplinary 
achievements. 
 
 
(1) Does NE foster unification across its parent disciplines? 
 
 
NEs often manifest the ambition to provide a unified interdisciplinary framework to 
model and account for human choice behaviour. For example, Fehr and Rangel 
allege that NE aims to develop a “detailed computational and neurobiological […] 
foundation for understanding human behavior across the natural and social 
sciences” (2011, 4). Similarly, Glimcher maintains that “the goal of [NE] is to 
produce a single unified model of human decision making that spans the economic, 
psychological, and neuroscientific levels of analysis” (2011, 4). NEs do not 
presently share precise views as to what contributions NE’s parent disciplines are 
to provide to their still-to-come ‘single unified model’ (see Sections 2-4). Suppose, 
for the sake of argument, that they reached consensus on this issue. Even so, two 
major questions would remain regarding NEs’ calls to develop such a single 
unified model. The first question is whether integrating findings and modelling 
tools from disciplines as diverse as economics, psychology, and neuroscience into a 
single unified model is feasible. The second question is whether this unification, 
even if feasible, brings valuable modelling and theoretical benefits to NE’s parent 
disciplines. I already commented on the latter issue in other articles (see e.g. 
Fumagalli, 2011). In this Section, I critically assess the prospects of NEs’ 
unificationist efforts. 
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Over the last few decades, several attempts have been made to integrate findings 
and modelling tools across economics and psychology (see e.g. Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979, on prospect theory, and Loomes and Sugden, 1982, on regret 
theory). Fruitful interdisciplinary interactions have taken place in various areas of 
neuro-psychological research (see e.g. Mundale and Bechtel, 1996, and Piccinini 
and Craver, 2011, on the integration of functional and mechanistic insights across 
cognitive psychology and computational neuroscience). According to leading NEs, 
promising advances are underway also at the interface between economics and 
neuroscience. These alleged advances are prompted not just by bottom-up 
neuroscientific findings, but also by top-down behavioural evidence. 
 
To give one example, after observing that neural activations in the lateral 
intraparietal area correlate with the relative expected desirability of saccadic eye 
movements in monkeys, Dorris and Glimcher conjecture that activations in this 
area “may also encode the subjective desirability of actions in humans” (2004, 
376). Suppose this was actually the case. As noted by Glimcher (2011, 234-6), it 
would be mistaken to infer from this result that the human brain encodes only 
relative expected subjective values. For any organism whose valuation system 
stores only these values would make intransitive choices much more often than 
humans. In this respect, observed behavioural patterns constrain NE models by 
suggesting that both relative and absolute value signals must be encoded in the 
human neural architecture. 
 
This example nicely illustrates how economic and neuro-psychological findings 
can constrain NE models of choice. However, NEs’ integrative achievements are 
typically confined to specific modelling contexts and do not directly advance the 
construction of a single unified model spanning NE’s parent disciplines. Moreover, 
there are several reasons to doubt the prospects of NEs’ attempts to develop this 
single unified model. I shall comment on two such reasons in turn. 
 
The first reason relates to the dissimilar interpretations that NEs and other 
economists respectively give to choice models. The following contrast highlights a 
profound divide between these interpretations (see e.g. Kable and Glimcher, 2009, 
on ‘traditional’ economic models and ‘because’ NE models; see also Fehr and 
Rangel, 2011, on ‘as if’ and ‘as is’ models of choice). On the one hand, economic 
modellers usually abstract from the mechanistic underpinnings of choice and do not 
take a position as to what neuro-psychological processes underlie observed 
decisions. On the other hand, several NE modellers aim to show that agents who 
behave as predicted by standard economic theory do so because specific neural 
areas encode the relative expected values of the available options. The fact that 
economic modellers do not take a position as to what neuro-psychological 
processes underlie observed decisions does not per se vindicate these modellers’ 
interpretation of choice models. For neural findings may advance the economic 
modelling of choice even though NEs and other economists give dissimilar 
interpretations to choice models (see e.g. Camerer, 2008, on calls to use neural 
findings to discriminate between competing economic models, and Glimcher, 
2011, ch.4-6, on attempts to build more predictive and explanatory models of 
choice). Still, the diversity of these interpretations poses severe pragmatic and 
 5 
methodological challenges to NEs’ calls to use neural findings in constructing and 
evaluating economic models.
2
 
 
My second reason to doubt the prospects of NEs’ unificationist efforts builds on 
NEs’ divergences regarding the ultimate goals of NE research. At first glance, most 
NE studies seem primarily concerned with investigating the neural substrates of 
choice.
3
 This, however, falls short of implying that NEs share the same view as to 
what NE ultimately aims to accomplish. To see this, let us contrast the main 
research goals that are respectively associated with so-called ‘behavioural 
economics in the scanner’ and ‘neurocellular economics’ (Ross, 2008, 473-4). On 
the one hand, the proponents of behavioural economics in the scanner (e.g. 
Camerer et al., 2005) employ the neural evidence obtained in specific experimental 
tasks to discriminate between competing economic models and shed light on 
specific violations of standard economic theory. On the other hand, the advocates 
of neurocellular economics (e.g. Glimcher, 2011, ch.3-5) use economists’ 
constrained optimization techniques to model the workings of the neural substrates 
of decisions and improve models of reward valuation in cognitive and 
computational neuroscience. These divergences do not preclude distinct groups of 
NEs from pursuing some common research goals (see e.g. Vromen, 2011, on the 
development of more predictive models of choice). Still, they point to a profound 
methodological cleavage, which has pervasively shaped the research agendas of 
prominent NEs (see e.g. Glimcher et al., 2005). 
 
A proponent of NE may concede that NEs’ divergences concerning the ultimate 
goals of NE research hamper unification across NE’s parent disciplines. At the 
same time, she might object that the practitioners of these disciplines could build 
integrated models of decision-making, and yet continue to investigate their 
phenomena of interest by means of traditional methodologies and modelling 
approaches. The idea is that economists, psychologists and neuroscientists develop 
a common NE framework for modelling choices that transcends the methodologies 
and the modelling approaches entrenched in each discipline (Glimcher and 
Rustichini, 2004, 452). In this way, NE could allegedly improve its parent 
disciplines on their own terms without having to literally unify these disciplines’ 
methodologies and modelling approaches (Camerer, 2008, 59). 
 
NEs’ calls for interdisciplinary unification seem less implausible if one charitably 
takes NEs to be developing - not so much a single unified model of decision-
                                                           
2
 I expand in Section 3 on the challenges faced by NEs’ calls to employ neural findings for 
model selection purposes in economics. As to the predictive and explanatory benefits 
yielded by NEs, I articulated in previous works two challenges to NEs’ calls to use neural 
findings in constructing and evaluating economic models. The first challenge (Fumagalli, 
2011) is that due to the trade-offs between the desiderata respectively valued by NEs and 
other economists, showing that neural findings help economists to satisfy specific 
desiderata falls short of implying that NEs enable economists to build better models of 
choice. The second challenge (Fumagalli, 2014) is that NEs have hitherto failed to 
significantly improve economic models even with regard to individual desiderata. 
3
 I speak of ‘neural substrates of choice’ broadly to indicate both algorithmic and neuro-
anatomical findings. The proponents of NE frequently emphasize that NE studies target 
both sets of findings. For instance, Montague argues that there are “two natural [NE]”, one 
which investigates “the behavioural algorithms running on [the] neural tissue”, the other 
which examines “the way that neural tissue is built, sustains itself through time, and 
processes information efficiently” (2007, 219). 
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making, but rather - a common modelling framework, i.e. a collection of models 
which share a relatively precise characterization of NE, pursue similar explanatory 
aims, and reflect consistent views of the relationship between NE’s parent 
disciplines. However, the differences between distinct approaches to NE (see e.g. 
Sections 2 and 4) hamper NEs’ attempts to provide a common modelling 
framework spanning economics, psychology and neuroscience. Moreover, NEs 
presently lack the shared basic constructs to develop such framework. To be sure, 
some constructs (e.g. utility) do figure in various models of choice across NE’s 
parent disciplines. Still, these constructs are given rather different interpretations 
by the practitioners of those disciplines, and NEs often fail to acknowledge how 
heavily such differences hinder their unificationist ambitions (see e.g. Fumagalli, 
2013, on distinct notions of utility). Paraphrasing what Kahneman observed 
concerning economics and psychology, “there are no immediate prospects of 
economics [psychology and neuroscience] sharing a common theory of human 
behavior” (2003, 165-6). 
 
More generally, the point remains that economists, psychologists and 
neuroscientists have made considerable advances by relying on highly specialized 
methodologies and modelling approaches. This historical record does not license 
the isolationist attitude exhibited by some detractors of NE (see e.g. Gul and 
Pesendorfer, 2008). Yet, coupled with the challenges faced by NEs’ attempts to 
build a unified interdisciplinary model of choice, it counsels choice modellers to 
reflect before embarking on ambitious transdisciplinary Russian campaigns. That is 
to say, one welcomes NEs’ attempts to integrate findings and modelling tools 
across different decision sciences. Even so, severe concerns remain regarding the 
project to provide a single unified model of choice spanning economics, 
psychology and neuroscience. In this perspective, NEs’ calls for interdisciplinary 
unification seem inspired more by unreflective enthusiasm for recent advances in 
neuro-psychological research than by principled observations concerning how NE 
informs its parent disciplines. 
 
 
(2) How do NEs’ findings inform the economic modelling of choice? 
 
 
NEs advocate heterogeneous positions concerning the ways in which their findings 
are supposed to inform NE’s parent disciplines. Two positions are frequently 
contrasted with regard to how such findings putatively inform the economic 
modelling of choice.
4
 On the one hand, incremental NE “adds variables to 
conventional accounts of decision making or suggests specific functional forms to 
replace ‘as if’ assumptions that have never been well supported empirically” 
(Camerer et al., 2005, 10). On the other hand, radical NE asks “how economics 
might have evolved differently if it had been informed from the start by insights 
and findings now available from neuroscience” (ibid., 10). These claims, which 
echo former categorizations of behavioural economists’ contributions (see e.g. 
Rabin, 1998), highlight what is commonly regarded as a fundamental divide 
between distinct approaches to NE research (see e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008). 
                                                           
4
 Expressions such as ‘informing economic models’ and ‘informing the economic 
modelling of choice’ are used in different senses by distinct authors. In this paper, I 
employ such expressions to refer to the thesis that NE findings have direct evidential and 
explanatory relevance for the economic modelling of choice. 
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In this Section, I assess various interpretations of those claims and expand on an 
alternative conceptualization of the incremental/radical divide. 
 
Taken literally, Camerer et al.’s characterization of incremental and radical NE 
does not appear to withstand scrutiny. Indeed, as I argue below, it is difficult to 
provide a plausible interpretation of such characterization. Concerning incremental 
NE, it remains unclear what exactly Camerer et al. mean when they prefigure the 
replacement of “as if assumptions that have never been well supported empirically” 
(2005, 10). After all, one might complain about the purported ad hocness or non-
falsifiability of some ‘as if’ defences of rational choice theory. Yet, economists’ ‘as 
if’ assumptions neither presuppose nor entail specific hypotheses concerning the 
neuro-psychological substrates of decisions. This, in turn, challenges NEs to 
explicate on what grounds empirical findings about these substrates would compel 
economists to replace their ‘as if’ assumptions. More generally, the question 
remains as to why economists should adopt the functional forms used by modellers 
whose methodological presuppositions and explanatory aims differ sharply from 
their own (see Section 1; see also Section 3 for a discussion of NEs’ calls to 
discriminate between economic models in terms of their relative fit with neural 
findings). 
 
Regarding Camerer et al.’s counterfactual characterization of radical NE, one 
wonders whether it makes sense to ask how economics might have evolved if 
current neuroscience had influenced it from ‘the start’. To be fair, one does not 
have to put forward a hyper-detailed counterfactual history of economic theory to 
defend Camerer et al.’s characterization of radical NE. Still, the limitations 
affecting our epistemic access to counterfactual developments in the history of 
economic theory significantly constrain the informativeness of such 
characterization. In particular, it is difficult to see on what basis we are to ascertain 
how economics might have evolved, had it been informed by insights and findings 
now available from neuroscience. Maybe we would have quasi-infallible, neurally 
informed economic models with tremendous predictive credentials. Or perhaps 
economists would have fallen prey of irredeemable confusion due to pan-
explanatory hubris. In short, the range of possibilities is so wide that favouring one 
particular counterfactual scenario would appear to be quite arbitrary. 
 
That said, let us try to articulate a more informative conceptualization of the 
incremental/radical divide. In his 2010 article, Fumagalli explicates the distinction 
between incremental and radical NE as follows. On the one hand, incremental NE 
proceeds on the assumption that economists’ traditional constructs (e.g. preference 
relations, standard equilibrium concepts) provide a suitable basis for modelling 
people’s decisions and relies on neuro-psychological findings to adjust or enrich 
specific economic models. On the other hand, radical NE challenges economists to 
modify or even replace their traditional constructs and aims to implement 
substantial changes in economic theory. Two remarks about this characterization of 
incremental and radical NE are in order. 
 
First, the incremental/radical divide is best depicted not so much as an all-or-
nothing dichotomy, but rather as a continuum along which intermediate positions 
can be differentiated. To be sure, whether one takes the accumulation of 
incremental modifications to constitute radical changes may depend on how she 
conceives of the relationship between economic models and economic theory. 
 8 
Nonetheless, one may draw on entrenched accounts of the relationship between 
models and theories to argue that the divide between incremental and radical NE is 
more plausibly characterized as a matter of degree rather than an all-or-nothing 
affair (see e.g. Suppe, 1989, 3-37, on distinct variants of the semantic view of 
scientific theories, which regards such theories as collections of models).
5
 
 
And second, Fumagalli’s contrast between incremental and radical NE cuts across 
other informative categorizations of NEs’ contributions. To see this, suppose you 
wanted to classify NEs’ contributions in terms of how pervasively they influence 
economists’ modelling practices. On the one hand, an incremental contribution 
may have considerable influence on such practices. For instance, NEs have recently 
succeeded in predicting individuals’ decisions across a range of short-term, 
stimulus-bound rewards by monitoring the activation patterns of specific neural 
areas (see e.g. Levy and Glimcher, 2012). These studies do not currently yield 
predictions over sufficiently extended temporal horizons to be valuable to 
economists (Fumagalli, 2014). However, they pave the way for incremental NE 
contributions that could in principle prompt far-reaching modifications in economic 
modelling (e.g. think of NE models that reliably predicted decisions between long-
term, non-stimulus-bound choice options). On the other hand, a radical contribution 
might have limited impact on economists’ modelling practices. By way of 
illustration, consider recent attempts to ‘bridge the gap’ between neuroscience and 
economics by linking neuroscientific measurement protocols, observed behavioural 
responses, and formal choice theory through rigorous axiomatic statements. 
 
In a pioneering contribution, Caplin and Dean (2008) develop an axiomatic model 
of reward valuation, which relates both experienced and predicted rewards to 
observable dopaminergic activations via a set of axiomatic statements. This model 
aims to provide an axiomatic foundation for the so-called ‘reward prediction error’ 
hypothesis, which states that dopaminergic activations encode the difference 
between experienced and predicted rewards (reward prediction error, RPE). Before 
this contribution, several studies had associated specific RPE models with fMRI 
measurements of neural activity in dopamine target areas (see e.g. Rutledge, 2010, 
for a review). Caplin and Dean (2008) move beyond these studies by identifying a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions that neural activations from any brain 
area must satisfy to represent a RPE signal. Building on this work, Caplin et al. 
(2010) present the first application of an axiomatic representation theorem to test 
the reward prediction error hypothesis using neurobiological data. In their view, 
such application “rigorously tests and confirms [previous] evidence indicative of 
[such hypothesis] in fMRI data” (ibid., 951). 
 
Caplin et al. provide neuroscientists interested in the neural underpinnings of belief 
formation and reward value learning with an innovative method to test entire 
classes of RPE functional forms. Moreover, their work illustrates how economists’ 
axiomatic approach may be applied to model various phenomena besides those 
traditionally targeted by economists. Even so, Caplin et al. only demonstrate that 
their axioms of interest are satisfied at the aggregate level rather than for each 
experimental subject, and rely on some questionable assumptions (see e.g. Camerer, 
                                                           
5
 Fumagalli (2010) occasionally contrasts incremental and radical NEs, as opposed to 
incremental and radical NE. Here I focus on the latter contrast, since several authors 
provide both incremental and radical contributions in their studies and are therefore hard to 
categorize as either incremental or radical NEs. 
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2013, on the assumption that predicted rewards remain fixed based on stated 
probabilities, rather than being adjusted along a time path). Furthermore, the 
investigated dopaminergic activations relate to choice less directly than the 
workings of areas targeted by recent studies of the neural substrates of decisions 
(see e.g. Bartra et al., 2013). To put it differently, Caplin et al.’s results do not 
directly bear on economic modelling and do “not immediately advance our 
understanding of choice” (2010, 953). 
 
At this stage, a proponent of NE may concede that NEs’ contributions currently 
have limited direct relevance for the economic modelling of choice. At the same 
time, she might insist that such contributions prompt major indirect changes in 
economic modelling through their influence on other disciplines. To give one 
example, Padoa-Schioppa infers that neuroscience can contribute to economics 
from the alleged facts that “neuroscience can contribute to psychology, and that 
psychology can contribute to economics” (2008, 450-1). This claim points to a 
more sophisticated conceptualization of the relations that putatively hold between 
NE’s parent disciplines than other NEs’ assertions (see Section 4). However, it is 
an open question whether the vague notion of ‘contribution’ on which Padoa-
Schioppa’s claim is premised grounds an informative transitive inference. That is 
to say, while NEs have hitherto made limited contributions having direct relevance 
for economic modelling, their indirect contributions seem exceedingly speculative 
to license the enthusiasm surrounding NE research. To be fair, some NEs’ 
exaggerations may be plausibly ascribed to the rhetoric of the discipline (see e.g. 
Mäki, 2010) and are expectable in light of NE’s early stage of development (see 
e.g. Vromen, 2010). Yet, the point remains that even leading NEs significantly 
overstate the evidential and explanatory relevance of their findings for the 
economic modelling of choice. 
 
 
(3) Do NEs’ findings advance model selection in economics? 
 
 
During a trip to Murano (Venice), you visit a glass craftsman in order to buy a 
present for your fiancé. As it happens, you are holding an expensive colourful vase 
of glass, and the vase falls out of your hand. A wide variety of models could be 
used to represent your attempt to catch the vase before it breaks on the ground. For 
example, your attempt may be modelled as if you were trying to minimize purely 
monetary losses, the acoustic noise resulting from the vase destruction, the sheer 
number of items that will predictably lie on the shop’s floor, and so on. As this 
example suggests, one may employ many different models to represent observed 
choice behaviour. However, the mere fact that multiple models are compatible with 
observed choice behaviour does not imply that such models are empirically 
equivalent, i.e. that no behavioural, psychological, neural, etc. findings can 
discriminate between them. 
 
What findings should economists employ to discriminate between their models of 
choice? Several NEs regard relative fit with the available neural findings as a 
prescriptive criterion for model selection in economics. The idea is to single out, 
among behaviourally equivalent models of choice, those that fit the available 
neural evidence best. Their reasoning goes as follows. Economists are often unable 
to discriminate between their models of choice on the sole basis of observed 
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decisions. Moreover, they frequently rely on “competing models that are either not 
tested, or if tested often explain the data equally well” (Vercoe and Zak, 2010, 
133). Fortunately, neural findings enable economists to restrict the set of models 
that are compatible with the available evidence (see e.g. Rustichini, 2009). Hence, 
economists should discriminate between their models of choice in terms of relative 
fit with neural findings.
6
 
 
Despite its apparent plausibility, this reasoning does not provide economists with 
convincing grounds to discriminate between their models of choice in terms of 
relative fit with neural findings. I shall explicate and discuss two reasons in support 
of this criticism in points i and ii below. The first reason is that neural findings 
rarely enable economists to restrict the set of choice models compatible with the 
available evidence to a significant extent. The second reason relates to NEs’ failure 
to show that economists should discriminate between their models of choice in 
terms of relative fit with neural findings in cases where such findings and other 
disciplines’ findings yield contrasting indications concerning which models fit the 
available evidence best. 
 
i) NEs often claim that neural findings significantly restrict the set of choice 
models compatible with the available evidence. For example, after contending that 
economists provide various axiomatic systems consistent with observed decisions, 
Camerer alleges that “neural tests could winnow a crowded field of possible 
[models] down to the more plausible [candidates]” (2008, 47). Similarly, Rustichini 
complains that economists lack effective strategies for model selection and asserts 
that neural findings can play a “fundamental role” in “pruning the multiplicity of 
models [and making] them closer to the hard experimental test” (2009, 58). 
 
Neural findings can in principle help choice modellers to restrict the set of models 
compatible with the available evidence. For instance, as noted by Glimcher (2011, 
ch.12), one might take the alleged fact that most sensory encoding of reward values 
is reference-dependent to favour prospect theory - which posits agents with a 
reference-dependent utility function (see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) - over 
standard expected utility theory. Even so, neural findings rarely enable economists 
to overcome their putative problems of evidential underconstraint. To illustrate 
this, let us consider one class of economic models where neural findings are 
frequently claimed to facilitate model selection, namely multiple-self models. 
 
Multiple-self models represent agents’ decisions as the outcome of the interactions 
of various types of sub-personal entities (e.g. psychological processes, neural 
populations). A wide range of multiple-self models have been proposed in the 
economic literature. For example, some represent choices as the solution of a 
bargaining game among sub-personal agents with conflicting utility functions (see 
e.g. Benhabib and Bisin, 2005). Others, instead, characterize decisions as outcomes 
of the interplays between a sequence of short-run impulsive selves and a long-run 
                                                           
6
 Neural findings are claimed to serve discriminatory purposes in various disciplines 
besides economics (see e.g. Kable, 2011, on the opportunity to combine brain-imaging and 
brain-stimulation findings to discriminate between psychological theories). Here I focus on 
the use of such findings for model selection in economics. In doing so, I employ the 
expression ‘available evidence’ broadly to indicate the set of behavioural, psychological, 
neural, etc. findings that are taken to bear on the merits of the examined models unless I 
mention a specific subset of those findings. 
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patient self (see e.g. Fudenberg and Levine, 2006). NEs often conjecture that neural 
findings help economists to discriminate between multiple-self models by 
associating the sub-personal entities posited by these models with specific neural 
areas. Yet, it is doubtful that neural findings aptly serve this purpose. For in primis, 
economists make no explicit presuppositions as to whether the sub-personal entities 
posited by multiple-self models map onto particular neural counterparts (see e.g. 
Harrison, 2008). And second, severe evidential concerns affect NEs’ intended 
applications of neural findings for model selection purposes in economics. 
 
By way of illustration, consider leading NEs’ debate as to whether multiple selves 
map onto anatomically separate neural populations in individuals’ intertemporal 
choices. In a series of experiments, McClure et al. (2004 and 2007) examine the 
neural correlates of individuals’ choices between pairs of monetary rewards 
available at distinct points in time. After observing that the ventral striatum, the 
medial orbitofrontal cortex, and the medial prefrontal cortex undergo differential 
activations during choice tasks involving temporally proximate versus more distant 
rewards, they infer that anatomically separate neural systems respectively value 
immediate and delayed monetary rewards. McClure et al.’s findings have been 
taken to provide convincing evidence in favour of a two-component model of 
intertemporal choice (see e.g. Carter et al., 2010). However, the reported evidence 
demonstrates neither that the examined areas discount rewards at different rates in 
each subject nor that these areas’ discount rates differ significantly from the 
discount rates revealed by each subject’s choices. Moreover, comparative NE 
studies document that a single-parameter hyperbolic discounting function fits 
observed neural activations better than McClure et al.’s two-component model (see 
e.g. Kable and Glimcher, 2007). Hence, it remains an open question whether the 
areas indicated by McClure et al. constitute plausible candidate neural referents for 
the multiple selves hypothesized to model agents’ intertemporal choices. 
 
Analogous considerations apply to other influential proposals to employ neural 
findings to discriminate between standard economic models. To see this, consider 
recent applications of NE studies of the neural substrates of reward valuation. 
Various NEs claim to have identified anatomically delimited neural areas that 
encode the subjective values of individuals’ choice options on a common neural 
scale (see e.g. Levy and Glimcher, 2012). Some advocate measuring these areas’ 
activations to construct “an independent measure of [subjective] value, in principle 
dissociable from choices”, so as to render the claim that choices maximize 
subjective values “falsifiable” (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011, 335). In their view, building 
a neural measure of subjective value would constitute a major advancement in 
economic modelling, since subjective values cannot be measured independently of 
choices on the basis of choice data alone. Regrettably, neither constructing a neural 
measure of subjective value nor establishing under what circumstances choices 
maximize the value of such measure bears directly on the merits of economists’ 
models. For these models make no assumption regarding what internal value 
function individuals actually use when assigning subjective values to particular 
choice options (see Section 1). 
 
ii) Suppose facing a situation where the available neural evidence enables 
economists to discriminate between their models of choice, in the sense that it 
yields precise indications as to which of these models fit the collected neural 
findings best. Relative fit with neural findings is just one among several criteria for 
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discriminating between economic models of choice. Moreover, relative fit with 
neural findings and the modelling desiderata valued by economists (e.g. 
explanatory relevance) often make conflicting demands on modellers (see 
Fumagalli, 2011). Hence, some cogent reason is needed to license the claim that 
economists should discriminate between their models of choice in terms of relative 
fit with neural findings as opposed to some other criterion such as compatibility 
with other disciplines’ findings (e.g. observed decisions, hedonic satisfaction 
reports, etc.). 
 
A proponent of NE may answer that relative fit with neural findings and 
compatibility with other disciplines’ findings are complementary - rather than 
competing - criteria for model selection in economics. The thought would be that 
neural findings provide economists with an additional source of evidence besides 
other disciplines’ findings that is worth having on distinct metrics of informational 
value. Now, NEs frequently urge other economists to build models whose 
assumptions and implications are consistent with findings from multiple disciplines 
(see e.g. Glimcher and Rustichini, 2004). Furthermore, various authors advocate 
triangulating findings from different disciplines in order to improve specific 
models of choice (see e.g. Kable, 2011). Nonetheless, these contributions do not 
substantiate the claim that economists should employ neural findings to 
discriminate between their models of choice (see point i above). In particular, NEs’ 
calls for this claim appear to face the following dilemma. 
 
On the one hand, neural findings and other disciplines’ findings may yield 
equivalent indications concerning which models fit the available evidence best. In 
this case, neural findings could increase one’s confidence in other disciplines’ 
findings, but do not provide economists with discriminatory insights beyond those 
yielded by such disciplines. This, coupled with the fact that modellers can rarely 
obtain accurate and reliable neural findings in situations where they lack access to 
behavioural and psychological findings, provides a reason to doubt that neural 
findings significantly advance model selection in economics. On the other hand, 
neural findings and other disciplines’ findings may yield contrasting indications 
regarding which models fit the available evidence best. In this case, some cogent 
reason is needed to license the claim that economists should discriminate between 
their models of choice in terms of relative fit with neural - as opposed to other 
disciplines’ - findings. Unfortunately, NEs have not offered yet precise and 
plausible criteria for dealing with cases where neural findings and other disciplines’ 
findings yield contrasting indications concerning which models fit the available 
evidence best. 
 
To be sure, some NEs manifest both descriptive and prescriptive ambitions, and 
maintain that economists should discriminate between their models of choice in 
terms of relative fit with neural findings. However, even leading NEs seem to 
overestimate the prescriptive implications of their findings for other economists. To 
see this, consider Glimcher et al.’s conjecture that by combining economic and 
neuroscientific findings, NE will develop “a methodology for reconciling 
prescriptive and descriptive economics” (2005, 214). NE findings may provide 
informative insights about the causal underpinnings of decisions, yet do not have 
direct implications regarding what people ought to choose in specific situations. 
Similarly, claiming that ideally choice models should be “tested simultaneously at 
the neural, psychological, and economic levels of analysis” (Glimcher, 2011, 132) 
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falls short of establishing that economists should discriminate between their models 
of choice in terms of relative fit with neural findings. For this regulative ideal does 
not specify how modellers should deal with cases where neural findings and other 
disciplines’ findings conflict. Moreover, one may endorse such regulative ideal 
without being committed to regard compatibility with findings from multiple 
disciplines as a prescriptive criterion for model selection in economics. Indeed, 
requiring that economic models be compatible with all the available behavioural, 
psychological and neural findings would often be needlessly restrictive. For 
economists can frequently achieve their predictive and explanatory goals by 
building models whose assumptions neglect or even contradict specific subsets of 
these findings (see e.g. Fumagalli, 2014, on neural findings). 
 
 
(4) What disciplines provide the basic constructs for NEs’ accounts of choice? 
 
 
The proponents of NE commonly emphasize that developing informative accounts 
of choice requires one to integrate findings and modelling tools across NE’s parent 
disciplines (see e.g. McCabe, 2008). Nonetheless, NEs hold dissimilar views 
concerning what disciplines provide the basic constructs for their interdisciplinary 
accounts of choice. For instance, Dayan and Daw allege that decision theoretic 
concepts “permeate experiments and computational models in [both] psychology 
and neuroscience” and have “direct psychological and neural instantiations” (2008, 
429 and 450). For their part, Camerer et al. assert that “the traditional economic 
account of behavior, which assumes that humans act so as to maximally satisfy 
their preferences, starts in the middle […] of the neuroscience account” (2005, 27). 
Still differently, Glimcher et al. maintain that “ultimately, economics is a biological 
science” (2005, 254), and Zak and Denzau contend that “findings in the biological 
sciences need to be incorporated directly into economics if the discipline is to 
continue to produce relevant insights into human behavior” (2001, 32). 
 
The aforementioned assertions point to rather different conceptualizations of the 
intertheoretic relations that purportedly hold between NE’s parent disciplines. 
Prima facie, this diversity might seem an unproblematic or even welcome 
indication of pluralism on NEs’ part. After all - the thought would be - there is 
widespread disagreement as to how exactly NE’s parent disciplines are related, and 
it would be unnecessarily demanding to require NEs to reach consensus on this 
issue. Furthermore, different disciplines may jointly contribute to providing the 
basic constructs for NEs’ accounts of choice. In this Section, I inspect NEs’ 
assertions and argue that these assertions are premised on contentious 
conceptualizations of the intertheoretic relations between distinct decision sciences. 
I then focus on prominent attempts to reduce economists’ theoretical constructs to 
neural constructs and argue that such attempts rest on exceedingly speculative 
assumptions to effect the reductive accomplishments they envisage. 
 
Consider first Camerer et al.’s claim that economists’ account of behavior “starts in 
the middle […] of the neuroscience account” (2005, 27). This contention would be 
hardly informative if it restated the platitude that individuals’ decisions are 
preceded by neural events that are often “inaccessible to consciousness” (ibid., 31). 
For neuroscientists have been repeating for decades that specific neural regions 
frequently activate before the moment agents report making particular decisions 
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(see e.g. Libet, 1983). Conversely, Camerer et al.’s claim would strain credulity, if 
it were meant to suggest that NEs have the means to identify the basic physical 
determinants of individuals’ decisions. For neural events and processes result from 
the interactions of micro-physical constituents operating at more fine-grained 
spatio-temporal scales than those investigated by NEs.  
 
Similar concerns arise regarding NEs’ assertions about the purported biological 
character of economics. At first glance, it might seem that economics, defined as 
the study of human behaviour as a relationship between ends and scarce means 
having alternative uses (Robbins, 1932), has significant conceptual affinities with 
biology (see e.g. Marshall, 1890 [1961], book 4). This, however, falls short of 
licensing Glimcher et al.’s claim that “ultimately, economics is a biological 
science” (2005, 254). In particular, the hitherto proposed interpretations of this 
claim are vulnerable to the following criticism. On the one hand, interpreting the 
term ‘biological’ broadly - so as to suggest that economic models represent the 
behaviour of some generic living organisms - renders the claim trivial.
7
 On the 
other hand, narrower interpretations of such term fail to clarify in what sense 
economics constitutes a biological discipline and what implications this has for the 
economic modelling of choice.
8
 This does not exclude that NEs might find some 
plausible and precise conceptualization of ‘biological’ that avoids or circumvents 
the outlined criticism. Yet, it challenges those NEs who regard economics as a 
biological science to articulate such conceptualization. 
 
Zak and Denzau’s (2001, 32) contention that the advancement of economics is 
conditional upon the direct incorporation of biological findings is even more 
problematic. To be fair, various authors emphasize the relevance of biological 
findings for understanding economic phenomena (see e.g. Alchian, 1950, on how 
evolutionary thinking can shed light on the influences of competitive dynamics on 
agents’ decisions). Furthermore, biological findings may in principle help 
economists to identify situations where their models’ predictions are more likely to 
hold (see e.g. Satz and Ferejohn, 1994, on rational choice theory) and develop more 
explanatory models of choice (see e.g. Vromen, 2007, on the bioeconomic research 
program). This, however, by no means implies that the advancement of economics 
is conditional upon the direct incorporation of those findings. Indeed, it is hard to 
think of biological findings whose direct incorporation is necessary for the 
advancement of economic modelling and theorizing. 
 
Faced with the above criticisms, a proponent of NE may concede that several 
authors put forward disputable claims concerning the intertheoretic relations 
                                                           
7
 Some authors (e.g. Ross et al., 2008, viii) claim that standard economic models do not 
rest on explicit assumptions as to what sort of entities (e.g. human individuals, firms, 
neural areas) representative agents supposedly map onto. Yet, even those authors grant that 
economic modellers are ultimately concerned with living organisms of some sort (see e.g. 
Ross, 2009; see also Davis, 2009, for a discussion). 
8
 To give one example, Rosenberg infers that economics is a biological science on the sole 
ground that economists study “the causes and effects of the behavior of members of [the 
Homo sapiens] species” (2009, 60). The observation that economists investigate the causes 
and effects of humans’ behaviour does not per se make economics a biological science in 
an interesting sense. Moreover, Rosenberg puts forward questionable claims in explicating 
the implications of the alleged biological character of economics. In particular, he nowhere 
substantiates his claim that “almost everything mysterious and problematical […] about 
economics is resolved once we understand economics as a biological science” (2009, 59). 
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between NE’s parent disciplines. At the same time, she may rebut that NEs have 
made substantial advances in their attempts to link theoretical constructs across 
such disciplines. To assess this rebuttal, I shall focus on what many regard as the 
most advanced NE attempts to link economic and neural constructs, namely 
Glimcher et al.’s works on a partial reduction of decision utility to neural utility. 
 
Over the last few years, NE studies have provided increasingly detailed evidence 
concerning what variables are encoded in the human brain while individuals make 
decisions. These studies (e.g. Kable and Glimcher, 2009) integrate brain-imaging 
data with single-neuron measurements in non-human primates to document 
systematic correlations between individuals’ decisions and BOLD signals 
measured in areas such as the ventral striatum (VS) and the ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex (VMPFC). Building on these findings, various NEs contend that VS and 
VMPFC constitute the core of a neural valuation system for value-based learning 
and decision-making (see e.g. Levy and Glimcher, 2012). In particular, Glimcher 
conjectures that VS and VMPFC “contain all the neurons we require to extract 
[subjective values] for any object” (2009, 509). 
 
If correct, Glimcher’s conjecture could have momentous implications for choice 
modellers, since it may allow them to develop NE models that reliably predict 
choices even when expected utility theory fails to do so (Glimcher, 2011, ch.12-15). 
Moreover, it would provide a powerful rationale for modelling agents’ utility 
functions as integral parts of a neural mechanism for choice, rather than purely ‘as 
if’ theoretical constructs. The idea is that while traditional economic theory only 
claims that decision makers choose ‘as if’ they used a common currency for 
valuing options, subjective value representations are in fact computed and 
integrated at the neural level during choice. This, in turn, would constitute a crucial 
step in the development of a partial reduction of decision utility to neural utility 
(see e.g. Vromen, 2012). 
 
Unfortunately, there are both empirical and conceptual reasons to doubt Glimcher’s 
conjecture that VS and VMPFC activations are constitutive of reward valuation at 
the whole-individual level. For example, the available evidence suggests that VS 
and VMPFC compute and integrate subjective values in situations where 
individuals face short-term stimulus-bound rewards. Yet, in spite of recent attempts 
to extend such findings to non-stimulus-bound valuations (see e.g. Cooper et al., 
2013), we lack convincing evidence that the neural areas identified by Glimcher 
determine choice when it comes to the long-term non-stimulus-bound choices that 
interest economists (see e.g. Camerer, 2013, on choices that involve competition 
between habitual and goal-directed valuation systems). Furthermore, various 
studies document that other neural areas besides those indicated by Glimcher 
contribute to valuation in reward-guided behaviour (see e.g. Noonan et al., 2011, 
on complementary valuation processes implemented in different frontal cortical 
areas). 
 
These findings do not exclude that NEs may identify statistically significant 
correlations between individuals’ decisions and specific areas’ activation patterns 
in increasingly sophisticated choice tasks. However, taken together, they cast 
serious doubt on hitherto proposed reductions of decision utility to neural utility. In 
particular, they strongly support the supposition that decision utility may routinely 
diverge from NEs’ measures of subjective reward value. For several factors that 
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can be only partly accounted for in terms of neural computations of reward values 
(e.g. individuals’ ethical commitments, contextual variations in institutional 
constraints) often mediate the influence of neural activations on choices in real-life 
situations. In these situations, too many and overly speculative inferential steps are 
required to reduce decision utility to NEs’ measures of subjective reward value. As 
Ross puts it, “brains must always do something to produce behavior that 
implements choices; but this may not generally, let alone always, be direct neural 
computation of comparative reward values” (2011, 306). 
 
 
(5) Does NE prompt a revolutionary expansion of the evidential base of 
economic theory? 
 
 
Revolutionary scientific change has been the focus of heated methodological 
debates both in general philosophy of science (see e.g. Kuhn, 1962, and Lakatos, 
1970) and in specific disciplines (see e.g. Baumberger, 1977, and Blaug, 1975, on 
economic theory). The proponents of NE frequently speak of implementing 
revolutionary modifications in NE’s parent disciplines (see e.g. Shiller, 2011). In 
this last Section, I examine one respect in which NEs have claimed to foster such 
modifications. More specifically, I shall critically assess the thesis that NEs’ 
contributions prompt a revolutionary expansion of the evidential base of economic 
theory, i.e. the set of explanatory variables that inform and are to figure into such 
theory. The idea is that NEs can observe variables that “are considered inherently 
unobservable” by other economists (Camerer, 2008, 45), and that NE’s “largest 
payoff […] may come from pointing to biological variables which have a large 
influence on behaviour and are underweighted or ignored in [economic] theory” 
(Camerer, 2007, C35).
9
 
 
To assess the cogency of these claims, let us distinguish the following three 
progressively broader conceptualizations of the evidential base of economic theory. 
On a first conceptualization, this base includes exclusively observable choices. 
This view has been advocated by a number of authors, ranging from early 
proponents of the revealed preference approach to some contemporary researchers 
(e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer, 2008). A more inclusive conceptualization holds that 
both observable choices and psychological variables (e.g. hedonic satisfaction 
reports) belong to the evidential base of economic theory. This view has been 
endorsed by several behavioural economists (e.g. Simon, 1955, and Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979), who urged other economists to combine behavioural and 
psychological findings in constructing and assessing their models. According to a 
third, even broader conceptualization, the evidential base of economic theory 
comprises not just observable choices and psychological variables, but also neural 
variables. In this perspective, NEs’ calls to incorporate neuro-psychological 
                                                           
9
 NE has been claimed to foster revolutionary changes in other respects besides the one 
examined in this Section. For instance, Glimcher and Rustichini (2004) emphasize the 
scope of NEs’ proposed revolution, which supposedly encompasses the accounts of choice 
respectively developed by economists, psychologists, and neuroscientists. For his part, 
Glimcher (2011, ch.6) insists on the depth of NEs’ purported revolution, which allegedly 
fosters the reduction of some basic constructs employed in NE’s parent disciplines. I gloss 
over these considerations here, since I already commented on them in Sections 1 and 4. 
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variables into economic models of choice may be seen as the most recent wave of a 
long-lasting process of expansion of the evidential base of economic theory.
10
 
 
Now, current brain-imaging and brain-stimulation tools do enable NEs to measure 
and causally manipulate several variables besides observed choices (see e.g. 
Camerer, 2008). This, however, falls short of indicating that NEs’ contributions 
foster a significant - not to say revolutionary - expansion of the evidential base of 
economic theory. To be sure, I am not rehearsing Gul and Pesendorfer’s dictum 
that “neuroscience evidence cannot refute economic models because the latter 
make no assumptions and draw no conclusions about the physiology of the brain” 
(2008, 4). For the mere fact that economists and neuroscientists respectively target 
different sets of explanatory variables does not per se preclude NEs from 
prompting a significant expansion of the evidential base of economic theory (e.g. 
the availability of increasingly detailed neural findings could in principle lead 
economists to adopt a broader conceptualization of such base). Still, NEs have not 
put forward convincing reasons to think that economists should include neural 
variables in the evidential base of economic theory. Let me explicate this concern. 
 
Several leading NEs take their contributions to prompt a momentous expansion of 
the evidential base of economic theory. By way of illustration, Fehr and Camerer 
maintain that while economists “treat preferences and beliefs as impossible or 
difficult to observe directly, [NE] rejects the premise of unobservability” (2007, 
419). Similarly, Levy and Glimcher contend that the available neural findings 
supply “a tool for measuring preferences neurobiologically” (2012, 1), and 
Camerer et al. allege that “the study of the brain and nervous system is beginning 
to allow direct measurement of thoughts and feelings” (2005, 10). Prima facie, 
these assertions might seem to be well supported by the ongoing advances in NEs’ 
observational tools and experimental protocols. Regrettably, those assertions rest 
on disputable presuppositions concerning economists’ constructs and the role such 
constructs play in economic theorizing. To illustrate this, let us focus on the notion 
of preference in contemporary rational choice theory. 
 
Economic modellers and methodologists have debated at length about the merits of 
distinct interpretations of rational choice theory. Two such interpretations are 
frequently contrasted in the economic literature (see e.g. Guala, 2012, and Hands, 
2012). On the one hand, we find a ‘thin’ behaviourist interpretation, according to 
which rational choice theory provides a purely formal representation of consistent 
behavioural patterns and makes no claim concerning the neuro-psychological 
underpinnings of choices. On the other hand, there is a ‘thick’ psychological 
interpretation, which takes rational choice theory to be grounded in a folk 
psychological conception of choices as the outcome of a process of instrumental 
reasoning. These behaviourist and psychological interpretations do not exhaust the 
                                                           
10
 This does not imply that NE is plausibly regarded as the mere continuation of 
behavioural and experimental economics with technologically more sophisticated 
instruments. I am not concerned here with discussing how NE differs from earlier research 
programs at the interface between economics and psychology. For present purposes, it 
suffices to note that NEs frequently criticize former works in behavioural and experimental 
economics. For instance, Glimcher et al. allege that most bounded rationality models “have 
little or no predictive power outside of their bounded domains” (2005, 214), and Glimcher 
contends that prospect theory “has too many interacting parameters to [be regarded as] a 
truly falsifiable theory” (2011, 120). 
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set of interpretations one may give to rational choice theory. Still, it is interesting to 
consider whether findings about the neural substrates of decisions supposedly 
expand the evidential base of such theory under each of those two interpretations. 
 
NEs’ findings do not directly expand the evidential base of rational choice theory 
when this theory is interpreted along ‘thin’ behaviourist lines. Indeed, the 
detractors of the ‘thin’ behaviourist interpretation commonly complain that 
adopting it severs rational choice theory from neuro-psychological research (see 
e.g. Guala, 2012). In this respect, adopting a ‘thick’ psychological interpretation 
might allow modellers to preserve continuity between rational choice theory and 
neuro-psychological research. Even so, one may endorse such interpretation, and 
yet deny that NEs’ findings expand the evidential base of rational choice theory 
with regard to the notion of preference. After all, the availability of increasingly 
accurate measures of the neural correlates of preferences falls short of implying 
that such preferences are observable directly. More generally, neither the ‘thin’ 
behaviourist nor the ‘thick’ psychological interpretation of rational choice theory 
licenses the claim that preferences constitute a suitable target for direct neural 
observation (see e.g. Hausman, 2011). 
 
At this stage, a proponent of NE might object that neural findings could foster an 
expansion of the evidential base of economic theory by prompting economists to 
refine their categorizations of economic phenomena or even employ different 
theoretical constructs. The idea would be to show that what was regarded as a 
unitary economic phenomenon in fact corresponds to distinct phenomena brought 
about by dissimilar neural mechanisms. Suppose that NEs succeed in 
demonstrating that particular economic phenomena (e.g. specific sets of 
intertemporal choices) are multiply realized at the neural level. This may be highly 
informative to choice modellers who investigate the neural substrates of decisions. 
However, it would neither mandate a refinement of economists’ categorizations of 
economic phenomena nor foster a replacement of theoretical constructs such as 
time preferences and intertemporal discount rates. For economists define economic 
phenomena and constructs by reference to observable variations in individual and 
strategic behavioural patterns rather than to the workings of specific neural areas 
and processes (see e.g. Ross et al., 2008, 10). This does not exclude that NEs’ 
findings might foster an expansion of the evidential base of economic theory. Still, 
it challenges NEs to put forward more convincing reasons to think that economists 
should include neural variables in the evidential base of economic theory. 
 
Analogous remarks apply to the discovery that the neural substrates of putatively 
distinct economic phenomena overlap to a significant extent. By way of 
illustration, suppose that considerable overlaps are identified in the neural 
substrates of individuals’ risk preferences, time preferences and social preferences. 
This finding may be evidentially and epistemically relevant for NE modellers. Yet, 
pace Fehr and Camerer (2007, 426), such finding does not appear to be especially 
“important” for other economists. In particular, it does not per se provide any 
convincing reason to think that economists should stop regarding these types of 
preferences as distinct. For the reasons why economists differentiate between those 
types of preferences relate not so much to the alleged lack of overlap in their neural 
substrates, but rather to observable variations in individual and strategic 
behavioural patterns. To put it differently, a lot of interesting work is under way at 
the interface between NE’s parent disciplines. Still, NEs’ findings are not shown to 
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foster a significant expansion of the evidential base of economic theory. This holds 
not just for some selected instances of self-promotional rhetoric on NEs’ part, but 
also for NEs’ claims concerning central economic constructs such as the notion of 
preference. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This paper argued for the following five theses on NE research: (1) NEs have made 
promising advances in integrating findings and modelling tools across NE’s parent 
disciplines, but lack an adequate basis to provide a single unified model of choice 
spanning economics, psychology and neuroscience; (2) the proponents of NE 
justifiably resist some isolationist defences of standard economic theory, yet 
significantly overstate the evidential and explanatory relevance of NE findings for 
the economic modelling of choice; (3) NEs persuasively advocate the construction 
of economic models whose implications are compatible with other disciplines’ 
findings, but do not presently provide convincing reasons to discriminate between 
economic models of choice in terms of relative fit with neural findings; (4) leading 
NEs have made innovative attempts to reduce economists’ constructs to neural 
constructs, yet rely on exceedingly speculative assumptions to effect the reductive 
accomplishments they envisage; and (5) NEs expand the set of explanatory 
variables that may figure in interdisciplinary models of choice, but have hitherto 
failed to prompt a significant (not to say revolutionary) expansion of the evidential 
base of economic theory. 
 
In commenting on the potential for success in early NE studies, several authors 
maintained that it is premature to judge NEs’ achievements (Quartz, 2008, 466, and 
Smith, 2007, 313), that the ultimate test lies in NEs’ future results (Bernheim, 
2009, 38, and Schotter, 2008, 77), and the like. As argued in this paper, various 
empirical and conceptual issues still wait to be sorted out and clarified in 
contemporary NE research. This, however, licenses neither unreflective optimism 
about the prospects of NE nor wholesale methodological anarchy. On the contrary, 
it is precisely by addressing these issues that economic methodologists can provide 
an informative evaluation of NEs’ contributions. 
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